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Dynamics of networking agents competing for high centrality and low degree
Petter Holme and Gourab Ghoshal
Department of Physics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, U.S.A.
We model a system of networking agents that seek to optimize their centrality in the network while keeping their
cost, the number of connections they are participating in, low. Unlike other game-theory based models for network
evolution, the success of the agents is related only to their position in the network. The agents use strategies based
on local information to improve their chance of success. Both the evolution of strategies and network structure
are investigated. We find a dramatic time evolution with cascades of strategy change accompanied by a change in
network structure. On average the network self-organizes to a state close to the transition between a fragmented
state and a state with a giant component. Furthermore, with increasing system size both the average degree and
the level of fragmentation decreases. We also observe that the network keeps on actively evolving, although
it does not have to, thus suggesting a Red Queen-like situation where agents have to keep on networking and
responding to the moves of the others in order to stay successful.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 89.75.Fb, 89.75.Hc
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory conceptualizes many of the circumstances that
drive the dynamics of social and economic systems. If such
systems consist of many pair-wise interacting agents they can
be modeled as networks. In such networks one can relate the
function of a vertex to its position. For example, in business
connections an agent would presumably like to be close, in
network distance, to the average other agent (1; 14). This en-
sures the information received from other agents to be up to
date (10) and will likely increase the agent’s sphere of influ-
ence. At the same time the agent would seek to limit the work
load by minimizing its degree (number of connections). In
this paper we define an iterative N-player game where agents
try simultaneously to obtain high centrality and low degree.
Agents remove and add edges by individual strategies. Fur-
thermore they update the strategies throughout the game by
imitating successful agents. We assume the agents have only
information about their immediate surroundings. As a re-
sult an agent can only re-link to, or observe and mimic the
strategies of, other agents a fixed distance away. Most recent
studies of games on networks, have considered a static un-
derlying network defining the possible competitive encoun-
ters (5; 7; 11; 13; 16). In other models where the network
co-evolves with the game (2; 3; 17), the agents are assigned
additional variables which serve as the basis of the game. In
our model however, the score of an agent is determined by the
network dynamics alone. This setting, apart from being con-
ceptually simpler, makes the relation between the game and
network dynamics more transparent. The rest of the paper
contains a precise definition of the model, an investigation of
the time evolution of the strategies and network structure, and
an investigation of the dependence on model parameters.
II. DEFINITION OF THE GAME
A. Score and moves
In our model N agents are synchronously updated over ttot
iterations. The initial configuration is an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi net-
work (4) of M0 edges. All steps of the dynamics keep the
network simple so that as multiple edges or self-edges do not
occur. The score, in our game, is an effective score taking into
account both the benefit of centrality and the inevitable cost of
maintaining the network ties. We want the score of a vertex i
to increase with centrality and decrease with its degree ki. Of
many centrality concepts (1; 14) we choose to base our score
on the simplest non-local centrality measure—closeness cen-
trality (the reciprocal average path-length from one vertex to
the rest of the graph). Furthermore, if the network is discon-
nected we would like the score to increase with the number of
vertices reachable from i. To incorporate this we use a slight
modification of closeness
c(i) =
∑
j∈H(i)\{i}
1
d(i, j) , (1)
where H(i) is the connected subgraph i belongs to and d(i, j)
is the graph distance between i and j. The number of elements
in the sum of Eq. (1) is proportional to the number of vertices
of i’s connected component. We use the average reciprocal
distance, rather than the reciprocal average distance. The for-
mer gives a higher weight on the count of closer vertices, but
captures similar features as the original closeness does. We
define a score function that incorporates the desired proper-
ties mentioned above:
s(i) =
{
c(i)/ki if ki > 0
0 if ki = 0 . (2)
In addition we assume the accessible information is restricted
to a close neighborhood of a vertex. To be precise, the moves
allowed to a vertex is to delete or add edges to agents up to two
steps away. Our assumption is motivated by the fact that in
real world systems, agents are more likely to have knowledge
of a restricted fraction than the whole network itself.
2B. Strategies
When a vertex i updates its position, it selects another ver-
tex in a set X (the neighborhood Γ(i) if an edge is to be re-
moved, or the second neighborhood Γ2(i) = { j : d(i, j) = 2} if
an edge is to be added). This is done by successively applying
six tiebreaking actions:
• Choose vertices with maximal (minimal) degree
(MAXD / MIND).
• Choose vertices with maximal (minimal) centrality in
the sense of Eq. (1) (MAXC / MINC).
• Pick a vertex at random (RND).
• Do not add (or remove) any edge (NO).
The strategies of a vertex is encoded in two six-tuples sadd =
(sadd1 , · · · , sadd6 ) and sdel representing a priority ordering of
the addition and deletion actions respectively. If sadd(i) =
(MAXD,MINC,NO,RND,MIND,MAXC) then i tries at first
to attach an edge to the vertex in Γ2(i) with highest degree. If
more than one vertex has the highest degree, then one of these
is selected by the MINC strategy. If still no unique vertex is
found, nothing is done (by application of the NO strategy).
Note that such a vertex is always found after strategies NO or
RND are applied. If X = ∅ no edge is added (or deleted).
C. Strategy updates and relinking errors
The strategy vectors are initialized to random permutations
of the six actions. Every tstrat’th time step a vertex i updates
its strategy vectors by identifying the vertex in Γi ∪ {i} =
{ j : d(i, j) ≤ 1} with highest accumulated score since the last
strategy update. Then i copies the parts of sadd( j) and sdel( j)
that j used the last time step, and let the remaining actions
come in the same order as the strategy vectors prior to the up-
date. For the purposes of making the set of strategy vectors
ergodic, drive the strategy optimization (8; 9) and model ir-
rational moves by the agents (6) we swap, with probability
ps, two random elements of sadd( j) and sdel( j) every strategy
vector update. Like the strategy space we also want the net-
work space to be ergodic (i.e. that the game can generate all
N-vertex graphs from all initial configurations). In order to
ensure ergodicity disconnected clusters should be able to be
re-connected. We obtain this by letting a vertex i attach to
a random vertex (not just a second neighbor) with probabil-
ity pr every trnd’th time step. This is also plausible in real
socioeconomic networks—even if agents are more influenced
by their network surrounding, long-range links can form by
other mechanisms (cf. Ref. (15)).
D. The entire algorithm
The outline of the algorithm is thus:
1. Initialize the network to an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network with
N vertices and M edges.
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FIG. 1 An example run for a 200-agent system with pr = 0.012. (a)
and (b) show the fraction of vertices having a certain leading strategy
for addition (a) and deletion (b) respectively. (c) show the average
score, (d) the average degree and (e) the number of vertices in the
system.
2. Use random permutations of the six actions as sadd and
sdel for all vertices.
3. Calculate the score for all vertices.
4. Update the vertices synchronously by adding and delet-
ing edges as selected by the strategy vectors. With prob-
ability pr an edge is added to a random vertex instead
of a neighbor’s neighbor.
5. Every tstrat’th time step, update the strategy vectors. For
each vertex, with probability ps, swap two elements in
a vertex’ strategy vector.
6. Increment the simulation time t and, if t < ttot, go to
step 3.
navg averages over different realizations of the algorithm are
performed. We will use parameter values M0 = 3N/2, ps =
0.005, tstrat = 10, ttot = 105 and navg = 100 throughout the
paper (the conclusions will not depend sensitively on these
values).
3III. TIME EVOLUTION
A part of the time evolution of a run of the game is dis-
played in Fig. 1. Fig. 1(a) and (b) show the fraction of the
agents having a specific main addition (sadd1 ) and deletion ac-
tion (sdel1 ) respectively. As we can see, the time evolution can
be very complex, having sudden cascades of strategy changes.
We do not display actions with lower priorities (s2, · · · , s6),
but we note that they are less clear-cut as they experience a
lower selection pressure. Typically the time evolution shows
rather lengthy quasi-stable periods punctuated by outbursts of
strategy changing cascades (in both the addition and deletion
strategies) as seen in Fig. 1(a) and (b). Not all strategies, as
we will see later, invade the population. As illustrated in this
example, MAXC is the most frequent main action for most
parameter values, whereas MINC and MIND (and NO for ad-
dition) are rare. From the definition of the actions we an-
ticipate differences in the network structure for time frames
of different dominating strategies. This is indeed the case as
evident from panels (c), (d) and (e) of Fig. 1 which display
the average score 〈s〉, degree 〈k〉 and number of vertices in
the largest connected cluster n1. The average score fluctuates
wildly suggesting that states of global prosperity are unstable.
Likewise the degree has an intermittent time evolution with
sudden high-degree spikes and periods of sparseness. Unsur-
prisingly, the high-degree spikes are located at the outbursts
of the NO deletion strategy where edges are not deleted, but
only added. The size of the largest connected cluster has an
even more dramatic time evolution, fluctuating between fully
connected and fragmented states. Note that there need not be
a dramatic change in degree to initiate a drop in n1—this leads
us to conclude that the phenomenon probably arises from net-
work topological effects.
Note that in Fig. 1(b) the strategies seem to differ in their
ability to invade one another, e.g. MAXC is followed by a
peak in RND. We investigate this qualitatively by calculating
the “transition matrix” T with elements T (s1, s′1) giving the
probability of a vertex with the leading action s1 to have the
leading action s′1 at the next time step. However note that
the dynamics is not fully determined by T, and is thus not a
transition matrix in the sense of other physical models. If that
were the case (i.e. the current strategy is independent of the
strategy adopted in the previous time step) we would have the
relation Ti j =
√
TiT j. So we measure the deviation from such
a null-model by assuming the diagonal (i.e. the frequencies of
the strategies) and calculating Θ defined by
Θi j = Ti j/
√
TiT j. (3)
The values of Θ for the parameters defined in Fig. 1 are
displayed in Tab. I. The off-diagonal elements are much
lower than 1 (the average off-diagonal Θ values are 0.014
for addition strategies and 0.010 for deletion). This reflects
the contiguous periods of one dominating action. Note that
transitions between MAXC and RND are over-represented:
ΘdelMAXC,RND ≈ Θ
del
RND,MAXC ≈ 0.027, which is more than twice
the value of any other off-diagonal element involving MAXC
or RND. To add to the complexity, the matrix is not com-
pletely symmetric ΘdelRND,NO is twice (∼ 3 s.d.) as large as
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FIG. 2 The structure of the network with MAXC as the leading
addition action. Parameter values are the same as in Fig. 1. Part
(a) shows the degree distribution for time steps where more than a
half of the agents use MAXC as leading action. The curves are log-
binned for large degrees. Errors are smaller than the symbol size.
Part (b) shows an example graph for N = 200. We emphasize that
this is only one of a great variety on network topologies that emerge
from the dynamics. The colors of the vertices represent the addition
actions as in Fig. 1.
ΘdelNO,RND meaning that it is easier for RND to invade NO as
a leading deletion action, than vice versa.
IV. DEGREE DISTRIBUTIONS AND THE INFLUENCE OF
DEGREE ON SCORE
To get a more detailed view of the relation between the pre-
ferred actions and the structure of the network, we investi-
gate the degree distribution p(k) for different leading actions.
In Fig. 2(a) we plot the degree distribution for the MAXC
dominating addition action. It is conspicuously wide—so de-
spite the fact that the vertex strategies are similar, the net-
work structure evolves into a highly inhomogeneous state.
There are peaks in the degree distribution close to k ≈ 0.4N
and k ≈ 0.8N, meaning that the network has at least one or
more hubs of extremely high degree. A snapshot of the net-
work with two hubs, each with degree close to N/2 is seen
in Fig. 2(b). Such a situation can indeed be rather stable:
The most central vertices (the vertices between the hubs) have
rather low degree, and thus have a very high score. Since these
are in Γ2 (but not in Γ) of most vertices, these will be the hubs
of the next time step, and the old hub will likely be between
these. Thus the property of being a hub will effectively oscil-
late between members of two sets of vertices.
V. DEPENDENCE ON SYSTEM SIZE AND ERROR RATES
Next we turn to the scaling of the strategy preferences and
structural measures with respect to model parameters. In
Fig. 3 we tune the fraction of random attachments pr for three
system sizes. In panels (a)-(c) we display the fraction of lead-
ing addition actions among the agents 〈σadd1 〉 (averaged over
∼ 100 runs and 105 time steps). As observed in Fig. 1(a) the
dominant strategy is MAXC followed by MAXD and RND.
The leading deleting actions, as seen in panels (d)-(f), are
4addition deletion
MAXC MINC MAXD MIND RND NO MAXC MINC MAXD MIND RND NO
MAXC 1 0.0164(3) 0.0088(2) 0.0107(4) 0.0151(5) 0.0010(0) 1 0.0100(2) 0.0131(4) 0.0094(2) 0.0266(3) 0.0126(3)
MINC 0.0169(3) 1 0.0113(6) 0.036(2) 0.025(2) 0.0017(3) 0.0098(2) 1 0.0070(3) 0.010(1) 0.0105(4) 0.0050(3)
MAXD 0.0093(3) 0.0104(7) 1 0.0103(6) 0.0206(9) 0.0003(0) 0.0133(4) 0.0067(3) 1 0.0055(2) 0.0124(3) 0.0062(2)
MIND 0.0115(4) 0.030(2) 0.0130(7) 1 0.059(5) 0.0020(2) 0.0087(2) 0.011(1) 0.0054(2) 1 0.0101(2) 0.0055(3)
RND 0.0157(5) 0.024(2) 0.020(1) 0.064(5) 1 0.0023(5) 0.0269(3) 0.0094(4) 0.0128(3) 0.0083(2) 1 0.0072(3)
NO 0.0007(0) 0.0031(2) 0.0009(0) 0.0036(2) 0.0042(4) 1 0.0097(3) 0.0076(3) 0.0053(2) 0.0078(3) 0.0131(3) 1
TABLE I Values for the Θ matrices for addition and deletion. (Θi j is the deviation from the expected value in a model of random transitions
given the diagonal values.) The values are averaged over 100 realizations of the algorithm. All digits are significant to one s.d. The parameter
values are the same as in Fig. 1. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors in units of the last decimal.
ranked similarly expect that MAXD has a larger (and increas-
ing) presence. There are trends in the pr-dependences of
〈σadd1 〉, but apparently no incipient discontinuity. This obser-
vation (which also seems to hold for ps scaling) is an indica-
tion that the results above can be generalized to a large param-
eter range. We also note that although the system has the op-
portunity to be passive (i.e. agents having sadd1 = sdel1 = NO),
it does not. This is reminiscent of the “Red Queen hypoth-
esis” of evolution (12)—organisms need to keep evolving to
maintain their fitness. The average degree, plotted in Fig. 1(g)
is monotonously increasing with pr and decreasing with N (if
pr & 0.12). For all network models that we are aware of (al-
lowing for fragmented networks) decreasing average degree
implies a smaller giant component. In our model the picture
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FIG. 3 The system’s dependence on the fraction of random
rewirings pr and system size N. Parts (a), (b) and (c) show the frac-
tion of preferred addition actions 〈σadd1 〉 for systems of 200, 400 and
800 agents respectively. Parts (d), (e) and (d) show the fraction of
preferred deletion actions for the same three system sizes, while (g)
shows the average degree and (h) the average size of the largest con-
nected component.
is the opposite, as the system grows the giant component spans
an increasing fraction of the network. This also means that the
agents collectively reach the twin goals of keeping the degree
low and the graph connected.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
To summarize, we have investigated an N-player game of
networking agents. The success of an agent i increases with
the closeness centrality and the size of the connected compo-
nent i belongs to, while it decreases with i’s degree. Such a
situation may occur in diplomacy, lobbying or business net-
works, where an agent wants to be central in the network (for
the purpose of having as new information as possible and be
more actively involved in the decision making process) but
not at the expense of having too many direct contacts. The
dynamics proceed by the agents deleting edges and attaching
new edges to their second-neighbors according to strategies
based on local information. Once in a while (every tenth time
step in our simulation) the agents evaluate the strategies of the
neighborhood and imitate the best performing neighbor to op-
timize their strategy. As the vertices of our model have no ad-
ditional traits—their competitive situation is completely deter-
mined by their network position—the time evolution of strate-
gies is immediately tied to the evolution of network structure.
These evolutionary trajectories are strikingly complex having
long periods of relative stability followed by sudden transi-
tions, spikes, or chaotic periods visible in both the strategies
and the network structure. One such instability is manifested
in a transient fragmentation of the network, this occurs more
rarely as the network size increases. In fact the network gets
more connected as size is increased, interestingly this is ac-
companied with a decreasing fraction of links—thus, with a
growing number of actors the system gets better at achieving
the common goal of being connected and keeping the degree
low. We also observe that the network dynamics never reaches
a fixed point of passivity (where the network is largely static),
this suggests situation similar to the Red Queen hypothesis—
agents have to keep on networking to maintain their success.
We believe network positional games will prove to be a useful
framework for modeling dynamical networks, and anticipate
much future work in this direction.
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